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TAXING STATUS: TAX TREATMENT 
OF MIXED BUSINESS AND PERSONAL 
EXPENSES 
Adi Libson* 
When, in disgrace with fortune and men’s eyes, 
I all alone beweep my outcast state, 
And trouble deaf heaven with my bootless cries, 
And look upon myself and curse my fate, 
Wishing me like to one more rich in hope, 
Featured like him, like him with friends possessed, 
Desiring this man’s art and that man’s scope, 
With what I most enjoy contented least; 
(William Shakespeare, Sonnet 29) 
 
What is the proper tax treatment of mixed business and personal 
expenses?  This question has much baffled legislators, courts and legal 
academics.  This Article proposes a new approach to this question that 
justifies the strict elimination of any deduction for mixed expenditures.  
Namely, the tax code should seek to tax status itself, not merely to 
redistribute wealth or improve welfare.  This Article argues that the social 
status that accompanies mixed expenses justifies eliminating the deduction 
and fully taxing the individual, regardless of whether the individuals 
actually benefits from the social status gained.  The central justification for 
taxing social status is based on the theory of relational egalitarianism which 
calls for social policy to shift its focus from redistribution of resources and 
welfare, to the social relationships among individuals in society.  
Furthermore, the argument for taxing status has broader implications 
beyond the case of mixed expenditures:  This Article therefore also 
addresses the tax treatment of fringe benefits, executive compensation, 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most celebrated problems in tax policy is the proper tax 
treatment of expenses that both have a business rationale and personal 
benefits (henceforth: “mixed expenditures”).  On the one hand, it makes 
sense that such expenses should be deducted from a taxpayer’s tax liability.  
After all, these expenses reflect a taxpayers’ cost of doing business, and 
thus should be subtracted from her gross income to reach her net income, 
the relevant benchmark for tax purposes.  On the other hand, such costs 
reflect the taxpayer’s consumption, and as such should be fully taxed and 
not deducted from her tax liability. 
Take, for example, a torts lawyer’s two-day trip from Chicago to New 
York for an ABA conference.  The conference is held at a state-of-the-art 
hotel and the lawyer will go to Broadway shows in the evenings to bond 
with other attorneys.  The cost of the trip is $1000.  The business value of 
the trip is greater than the cost for the lawyer, he really plans to expand his 
practice, and the conference will provide him the most up to date 
information in the field and connect him with top practitioners.  In addition, 
he will also derive greater personal benefits than costs from the trip 
because he loves New York and is a big Broadway fan. 
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The tension between these two values has not been solved in the 
American legal system.  The different elements in this case of mixed 
expenditures–the food, the lodging, the airfare, and the entertainment—are 
all treated differently by the tax code.  Some are fully deductible, some are 
nondeductible and others are somewhere between the two, permitting a 
partial deduction.1 
This article asserts that the general principle of tax law should be to 
fully tax such mixed expenditures, and not permit any deductions.  This 
assertion rests on a fundamental argument regarding the purposes of tax 
policy: that it should be concerned with the individual’s social status and 
not only his income or welfare level.  Consequently, social status should be 
incorporated into the tax base, or in other words, social status should be 
taxed as such.  This argument has potential implications far beyond the 
case of mixed expenditures, which will be discussed later in this article. 
In the context of mixed expenditures, the assertion is based on two 
arguments, the first clearing the field for the second, more fundamental, 
proposition.  The first argument is purely economic: taxing mixed expenses 
would reduce the distortionary costs of draping personal consumption as 
business expenses.  Simply put, the business expenses deduction 
incentivizes individuals to incur additional personal consumption expenses 
because these expanses can plausibly be represented as a business expenses 
and deducted from the taxable income.  Eliminating the business deduction, 
however, could generate a deadweight loss by reducing the amount of 
efficient business economic activities, though reduced distortion from the 
disguising of personal expenses as business might offset this loss.2  
Furthermore, even if in the overall elimination of the deduction creates a 
deadweight loss, it might still be efficient if the additional revenue raised 
by eliminating the deduction creates less deadweight than any alternative 
tax, since the elimination of a deduction is equivalent to a tax.  Almost all 
forms of taxation are accompanied by deadweight loss.  The answer to the 
 
 1.  The term “mixed expenses” bundles up a few distinctive situations that differ in the 
magnitude of the business expense relative to the magnitude of the personal benefit.  For the 
complete taxonomy of mixed expenses situations, see Daniel I. Halperin, Business 
Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 
122 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (1974) (detailing mixed expenses situations).  See also Thomas D. 
Griffith, Efficient Taxation of Mixed Personal and Business Expenses, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
1769 (1994) (discussing mixed personal and business expenditures and methods of taxing 
such expenditures).  The example above is a case that Halperin labels as “Either Alone”–
where both the business benefit and the personal benefit exceed the cost.  Halperin at 866. 
 2.  For a discussion of businesses shifting consumption to the investment category, see 
Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng, Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed Business Owners and 
Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329 (2013) (challenging traditional conventions 
of consumption and investment). 
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question of whether a tax is efficient does not hang on whether it generates 
a deadweight loss, but on the relative size of the deadweight loss in 
comparison to other forms of taxation that raise the same amount of 
revenue.  A tax that is accompanied by deadweight could be efficient, if the 
deadweight it generates is lower than alternative taxes that could 
potentially raise the same amount of revenue.3 
The second proposition behind this article is a philosophical argument 
regarding the proper base.  Namely, should taxation encompass social 
status even if this social status is not reduced to the form of consumption?  
This article argues that social status itself should be subject to tax, even if 
that status is not grounded directly on monetary consumption.  Thus 
because being situated in a position in which business and personal 
expenses are mixed confers high social status, an individual in this situation 
should be taxed regardless of whether the higher social status contributes to 
his welfare.  This insight, the central proposition of this article, is 
reinforced by the previous economic argument.  If the economic costs of 
this tax are not high, then the philosophical argument tilts the scales in 
favor of the tax, the tradeoff with efficiency being reasonable.  Examples of 
some additional implications of this philosophical argument will be 
discussed after presenting the two arguments for excluding mixed expenses 
deductions. 
In most tax policy scholarship, there is wide agreement that the tax 
base should be based on income.  Most inquiries regarding the tax base ask 
whether the transactions in question should be defined as income.  For this 
purpose, in most cases the Haig-Simons definition of income is employed: 
I = C + S 
In plain English, income equals consumption plus savings.  From this 
equation it can be inferred that if a transaction does not generate any 
consumption or savings for the taxpayer, it cannot be defined as income 
and thus should not be taxed.  This article questions whether taxation 
should be limited to income in this sense.  It argues that there may be other 
attributes besides consumption and savings that should be taxed.  This 
article will focus on the attribute of status, arguing that if a taxpayer gains 
status, even if he does not benefit from his status and thus cannot 
necessarily be viewed as consuming it, his status-creating or confirming 
activity should still be taxed.  For an individual, the possibility for mixed 
expenditures—the idea that in order for an individual to perform his job she 
needs mahogany furniture and a black limousine—is a feature of high 
 
 3.  Angar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature, 6 J. PUB. 
ECON. 37 (1976). 
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social status.  Therefore, the individual should be taxed for her mixed 
expenditures even if she does not benefit from the expenditure.  Although 
she might have sincerely preferred to work at a metal desk or commute on 
a bike, she is still ‘gaining’ high status by working at an expensive desk or 
riding in a limousine—a form of a limited positional good that should be 
taxed.4 
The idea that social status is a good that should be taxed independent 
of whether the taxpayer actually benefits from the good is based on a 
relational egalitarian view.  According to relational egalitarian view 
espoused by scholars such as Elizabeth Anderson,5 Samuel Scheffler,6 and 
 
 4.   This view is linked to the benefit principle approach for defining the proper tax 
base on grounds of fairness.  According to the benefit principle, the relative parameter for 
determining the fair amount of tax an individual should pay is the level of the benefit the 
state confers on him.  See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 315-16 (1960) 
(discussing that “almost all economic activity benefits from the basic services of 
government” and proportional taxation allows higher taxes imposed on the people who 
receive more benefits).  The benefit principle stands in contrast to the sacrifice principle, 
which is the primary alternative principle for defining tax fairness.  The sacrifice principle 
focuses on the subjective sacrifice individuals make in tax payments and strives to equate it.  
The first scholar to which the equal sacrifice principle is attributed to is John Stuart Mill, see 
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS 
ON SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 540 (5th London ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1896) 
(discussing equal sacrifice).  For the various possible versions of the equal sacrifice 
principle, see LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE 24-28 (2002).  The most dominant version of the equal sacrifice principle is the 
ability to pay principle, under which ability to pay is a proxy for the sacrifice incurred.  
Regarding the various versions of the ability to pay principle, see Richard A. Musgrave, 
Ability to Pay, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 1 (2d ed. 2005).  As 
will be elaborated later, the sacrifice principle also has a subjective version, but it is 
concerned with the sacrifice that the subject actually incurs.  The subjective element recasts 
the equality component of the equal sacrifice—the idea that the sacrifice imposed will be 
measured in absolute terms in contrast to a sacrifice of equal proportion relative to the 
features of the individual (in terms of welfare or resources).  See infra note 68 (discussing 
subjective and objective measures of prestige).  While the conventional understanding of the 
benefit principle is that the benefit should be determined subjectively—by reference to the 
actual extent which the individual values the benefit, the status approach focuses on an 
objective benefit—the status of the individual, independent of the individual’s personal 
valuation of the status signal.  This idea stems from the rationale of setting the price for 
public goods in proportion to the utility one derives from the public goods and not in 
proportion to the quantity consumed as in the conventional market based price setting.  See 
Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 157, 166 
(1999) (summarizing and critiquing interpretations of the benefit principle).  The analogy 
assumes that the benefit could be portrayed as a benefit that the state confers, an assumption 
that will be explained later, infra note 68. 
 5.  Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS 287, 288 (1999). 
 6.  Samuel Scheffler, Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality, 4 POL., PHIL. 
& ECON. 5 (2005). 
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Jonathan Wolff,7 social policy should focus on the relations between 
individuals, rather than a simple calculation of their relative wealth or even 
welfare level.  The main redistributive implication of such view is that such 
an approach may lead to equal taxation of individuals with different 
welfare levels.  In this sense it is similar to the rationale in the context of 
universal welfare programs that treat all individuals equally, independent of 
their resources or welfare level.8  According to the relational egalitarian 
view, the redistributive element in the heart of social policy should not 
necessarily aim solely at reducing gaps in wealth or welfare level.9  Instead, 
their direct concern is with the relations between individuals and not with 
other elements of just how well-off these individuals happen to be.  These 
other elements, such as welfare and resources, may be important due to 
their effects on relations between individuals, but they have no significance 
per se.  In contrast, positional elements, such as social status, receive 
greater attention due to their significant effect on the relationships between 
individuals within a society. 
This article argues that the relational egalitarian view may also have 
the reverse effect—it may prescribe transferring resources between 
individuals even when there are no wealth or welfare gaps.  There may be 
‘relational gaps’ that should be mitigated that do not necessarily reflect 
wealth or welfare gaps.  The classic case of such relational gaps is gaps in 
social status.  Being in a position where one’s business requires expenses 
that also benefit one on a personal level signals social status that should be 
taxed independently of whether one benefits from the expenses or even 
from the social status. 
This article proceeds as follows: Section I lays out the legal 
framework of the tax treatment of mixed expenses.  Section II presents the 
economic argument for taxing mixed expenses.  Section III presents the 
philosophical argument for taxing these expenses.  The first part of this 
section will lay out the relational egalitarian view, which functions as the 
normative framework for the argument.  The second part of the section will 
substantiate the claim that mixed expenditures is a paradigmatic case of 
creation of high social status from the perspective of the Weberian analysis 
of social status.  This turns it to a classic case for applying the argument for 
taxing status.  Section IV lists other possible tax implications of the 
 
 7.  Jonathan Wolff, Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos Revisited, 14 J. 
ETHICS, 335, 339 (2010); Jonathan Wolff, Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos 27 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 97 (1998). 
 8.  THEDA SKOCPOL, THE MISSING MIDDLE: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE FUTURE OF 
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 30 (2000). 
 9.  Anderson, supra note 5, at 336.  These scholars’ views stand in contrast with luck 
egalitarianism, see infra note 50, defining luck egalitarianism. 
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article’s main argument.  Section V then presents three possible critiques of 
the idea and their implications.  Finally, Section VI provides a conclusion. 
I. THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TAXING MIXED 
EXPENDITURES. 
Currently, tax law covering mixed expenses does not seem to be 
governed by one coherent principle—instead, it seems to be comprised of 
several different principles corresponding to several different situations.  In 
contrast to the positions held by many other scholars, however, it is 
possible to delineate an overarching principle unifying the treatment of 
mixed expenses. 
The ambiguity in the tax treatment of mixed expenses is rooted in the 
tax code.  Section 162 of the tax code states, “[t]here shall be allowed as a 
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during 
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . . . .”10  Yet section 
262 of the tax code includes the following, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly 
provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, 
or family expenses.”11  The question then arises: how should expenditures 
that are both ‘ordinary and necessary’ business expenses as well as 
personal expenses be treated?  The example at the beginning of the 
introduction is typical: a case where the expense maximizes the business’s 
profits and simultaneously confers considerable personal benefit on the 
taxpayer. 
Different types of mixed expenses receive distinctive treatments by 
statues, courts and I.R.S. regulations.  Some mixed expenses explicitly 
cannot be claimed for deductions, such as expenses for home offices and 
vacations homes,12 luxury water travel13 and inherently personal expenses 
such as haircuts.14  Other mixed expenses see significantly restricted or 
limited deductions; for example, entertainment and sport events deductions 
are limited to face value and the deduction for luxury box seats is limited to 
the face value of regular box seats.15  Some expenses permit only a partial 
deduction, such as meal expenses.16  Sometimes, courts have conditioned 
the deductibility of alleged business expenses on the existence of a 
 
 10.  26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2012). 
 11.  26 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2012). 
 12.  26 U.S.C. § 280A, 280F (2012). 
 13.  26 U.S.C. § 274(m)(1)(A) (2012). 
 14.  Richard Walter Drake v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 52 T.C. 842, 844 (1969). 
 15.  26 U.S.C. § 274(l) (2012). 
 16.  See 26 U.S.C. § 274(n) (limiting the deduction for business meals and 
entertainment to 50% of cost). 
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“primary” business motive.17  In other cases the courts have required that 
the expenses simply be “reasonable.”18 
Because there are so many tests and standards, most scholars have 
concluded that there simply is no unifying principle for the tax treatment of 
mixed expenses.  As Professors Michael Graetz and Deborah Schenk have 
noted “neither the IRS nor the courts had developed an overarching 
theory.”19  Professors Bankman, Shaviro and Stark have stated that “our tax 
system’s approach to this general problem has been somewhat ad hoc.”20  
This understanding is reinforced by political economy theories of 
legislation: most scholars believe that the legal treatment of mixed 
expenses does not stem from the acceptance of a systematic normative 
view or theory, but from political forces that determine the legal outcome 
ad hoc.21 
The existence of various tests does not necessarily mean that there is 
no overarching theory.  On the contrary, there may be a unified theory 
behind the legal treatment of mixed expenses but for practical reasons it is 
manifested in various legal tests.  There are two distinctive questions that 
need to be addressed before determining the legal theory behind the 
treatment of mixed expenses.  The first is the conceptual-theoretical 
question of how mixed expenses should be treated.  Assuming that the 
expense could be justified solely on business grounds or solely on personal 
grounds—and where neither is obviously the primary purpose—which of 
the two should have conceptual precedence?  Should the deductibility of 
the business expense be affected by the fact that the expense is also 
personal?  Should the tax liability of a personal form of consumption be 
affected by the fact that the personal form of consumption serves a business 
purpose?  If the expenses serve both purposes, should the motivation of the 
taxpayer be of any concern?  Should the deduction be proportional to the 
business and personal benefit?22 
 
 17.  Nickerson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 700 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 18.  Boehm v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 326 U.S. 287, 292 (1945). 
 19.  MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 252 (5th ed. 2005). 
 20.  JOSEPH BANKMAN, DANIEL SHAVIRO & KIRK STARK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
393 (16th ed. 2012). 
 21.  See James M. Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political 
Economy, 2 J.L. & ECON. 124, 134 (1959) (arguing that political outcomes are not 
necessarily shaped by social values). 
 22.  According to some scholars, the conceptual question might run one level deeper to 
the analytic level.  The problem might be not only how should cases in which there is both a 
business component and a personal component be treated.  The question whether a certain 
element is a business or personal expense might be indeterminate and is itself a social 
construct.  Tsilly Dagan, Commuting, 26 VA. TAX REV. 185, 193-95 (2006-2007). 
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Besides the conceptual question, there is also the pragmatic 
evidentiary question.  Almost any expense can conceivably be portrayed as 
a business expense.  In the case of Irwin v. Commissioner, a novel writer 
argued that his expenses for sending his daughter to a dormitory were a 
business expense—his writing was based on exposure to different 
experiences, and he sent his daughter to a dormitory as a research assistant 
so he would be exposed through her to the experience of living in a 
dormitory.23  Even if this argument seems farfetched, there is a whole array 
of cases in which personal expenses can indirectly generate significant 
revenue for a business.  There is no entity that we can rely on to determine 
whether the expenses will actually generate higher revenues.  Courts do not 
have the ability or skills to determine if a certain expense will really 
increase profits of a certain business.  Neither is the taxpayer a reliable 
entity for determining whether the expenditure is a sound business 
investment: in contrast to business decisions of directors and officers that 
are protected by the Business Judgment Rule in corporate law,24 taxpayers’ 
personal incentive does not necessarily allow us to presume they are doing 
their best to make rationale business decisions in the tax context. The 
central rationale for the court’s reliance on the discretion of the directors 
and managers is their motivation for making a sound business investment is 
generally aligned with the decision the legal system would like them to 
make: they would incur a personal loss from a bad business investment.25  
In the case of the taxpayer, the taxpayer benefits from classifying a 
transaction a business investment even if it is a very bad one.  He benefits 
significantly from classifying personal consumption as a business 
investment because of the tax benefits, even if the actual business impact of 
the expenditures is negative.  Although it is possible that managers and 
directors could gain from a bad business investment in which they invested 
less than optimal time obtaining relevant information because they gained 
leisure time as a consequence, in most cases they bear loss for bad business 
decisions on a personal level.26  The incentive to depict a decision as a 
sound business investment is therefore much stronger in the case of tax 
deductions, and thus could lead to excessive classification of expenses as 
 
 23.  72 T.C.M. 1148, 1150-51 (1996).  In addition he claimed a deduction for other 
business expenses, such as dental services and purchase of flowers as part of his research 
expenses for his writing, for which he needs to be exposed to a whole array of experiences.  
Id. at 1151. 
 24.  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 25.  See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 
BUS. LAW. 1437, 1442 (1985) (suggesting that managers and workers of a firm are more 
prone to suffer significantly from the firm’s poor results than investors who in most cases 
are diversified). 
 26.  Id. at 1441. 
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business related, as the case of Irwin exemplifies.27 
There is another important reason the plethora of tests does not 
necessarily reflect a profusion of competing principles on the conceptual 
level.  It may well be that on the conceptual level a certain principle is 
accepted, but due to evidentiary problems, Congress, the I.R.S. and the 
courts apply various presumptions to various expenses, trying for a rough 
approximation rather than theoretically optimal results.  For example, the 
rule that 50% of meal expenses are deductible28 does not necessarily stem 
from the assumption that a business meal both fully functions as an 
ordinary and necessary business expense and as a form of personal 
consumption and so rationally justifies a fifty-fifty split.  Instead, it may 
simply be that it is next to impossible to figure out how to properly split 
meal expenses.  Thus we chose to split the amount equally on pragmatic 
evidentiary grounds and not on theoretical considerations of the proper 
treatment of mixed expenditures. 
If the tax treatment of mixed expenditures is especially affected by 
evidentiary considerations, this fact sharpens the question on the 
conceptual level: what, therefore, is the basic principle underlying the legal 
system’s view of mixed expenses?  This article argues that the central 
premise underlying the legal system is the idea that serving a business goal 
is sufficient for entitling an activity to a deduction, independent of whether 
the expense also confers a personal benefit.  The limitation on business 
expenses that confer a personal expense stems from evidentiary 
considerations, and not from conceptual considerations.  Both the rhetoric 
of congressmen engaged in the legislative process and of the courts in 
rulings regarding mixed expenses support this view. 
When Congress enacted the statute that limits the deductibility of 
meals to 50% of costs in section 274(n) of the tax code in 1986, a report of 
the Senate Finance Committee explained: 
The committee believes the present law, by not focusing 
sufficiently on the personal-consumption element of deductible 
meal and entertainment expenses, unfairly permits taxpayers who 
can arrange business settings for personal consumption to 
receive, in effect, a Federal tax subsidy for such 
consumption . . . .  [I]n some cases the consumption may bear 
only a loose relationship to business necessity.29 
The Central Finance Committee’s motive for revising the law thus appears 
 
 27.  See supra text accompanying note 23 (listing excessive business deductions sought 
by Irwin). 
 28.  See supra note 16 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 274(n) to illustrate the limited deduction). 
 29.  S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 68 (1986). 
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to have been the fear that the taxpayer might use the meal expenses as a 
means to manipulate the tax system, not any concern about the underlying 
theory behind business deductions. 
In Rudolph v. U.S., Judge Douglas expressed a similar view, arguing 
that in essence all that matters for the deductibility of business expenses is 
that the expense have a real business purpose, and that it makes no 
difference whether the taxpayer benefits from the expense, “[w]hether a 
person enjoys or dislikes the trip that he makes with all expenses paid has 
no more to do with whether the expenses paid were compensation ‘for 
services’ rendered than does his attitude toward his job.”30  Treasury 
regulations also echo this view, noting “[i]t is not, however, necessary that 
an activity be engaged in with the exclusive intention of deriving a profit or 
with the intention of maximizing profits [for the activity to be eligible for a 
deduction].”31 
All three of these quotations reflect the idea that the focal issue for 
receiving a deduction is simply that the expense actually serve a business 
purpose.  Therefore, a taxpayer’s desire to gain a personal benefit from the 
activity should not affect the deduction.  Judge Douglas went so far as to 
hold that personal benefits should be completely disregarded, while the 
regulations still allow for the possibility that an activity for which personal 
benefit is the primary motivation might see a reduced deduction.  But either 
way the focus is placed on the existence of a business purpose. 
II. THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT 
Usually, scholars argue that business expenses deductions are 
economically beneficial even when the supposed business activity includes 
personal consumption elements.  In short, if the expense serves the goal of 
maximizing profits it should not be taxed.  After all, a tax on such expenses 
might deter the investment, and therefore an efficient business transaction 
would not take place. 
C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury in the Kennedy 
administration, succinctly expressed this idea in response to Kennedy’s 
policy of limiting mixed expenses deductions: 
Expenses incurred for valid business purposes should not be 
discouraged since such expenses serve to increase business 
income, which in turn produces additional tax revenues for the 
Treasury.  If valid business expenses were to be disallowed as a 
deduction (particularly expenses associated with selling 
 
 30.  Rudolph v. U.S., 370 U.S. 269 (1962). 
 31.  Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(9) (1972). 
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functions), there might be a substantial loss of revenue where 
business transactions are discouraged, or where they to fail to be 
consummated.32 
This section demonstrates why, on the contrary, economic analysis may 
support taxing mixed expenditures.  First, taxing mixed expenses is not 
necessarily inefficient all things considered: the reduction in the 
distortionary effect of the deduction may offset the loss from the reduction 
in beneficial economic activity that accompanies the elimination of the 
deduction.  Second, even if taxing mixed expenses is not necessarily more 
efficient than providing a deduction for such expenses, the costs of taxing 
mixed expenses aren’t as obvious as Dillon assumes.  Given that the 
economic costs of taxing mixed expenses aren’t significant, enables the 
philosophical argument in the following section to tilt the scales toward the 
elimination of mixed expenditures deductions. 
Taxing mixed expenditures will reduce the inefficient distortion of 
consumption patterns that the deduction generates.  Because goods that can 
be portrayed as business expenses are tax deductible, taxpayers probably 
tend to compensate themselves through such goods.  While they might 
prefer to be compensated through other goods of equivalent value or cash, 
the fact that mixed expenditure goods are tax deductible makes these goods 
desirable.  Compensation through goods that would not have been desired 
in a tax-free world creates a suboptimal allocation of goods.33 
An example easily illustrates this point.  An individual in a 50% 
marginal tax bracket contemplates whether he should purchase a mahogany 
desk for her business.  The mahogany desk is tax deductible as a business 
expense, even though it will not have any significant effect on the revenues 
of the individual’s business.  The cost of the desk is $100.  The individual 
is not a big fan of expensive furniture, and values the desk at $60.  He will 
still purchase the desk although it would be an inefficient transaction—a 
cost of $100 for a benefit worth $60. Why? Because he prefers being 
compensated with a Mahogany desk worth $60 that is tax free, to receiving 
$100 in cash that will only amount to $50 after tax.  This example reflects 
 
 32.  S. Comm. On Fin., Revenue Act of 1962, S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 25 (1962), 
reprinted in 1962 C.B. 707,731 (1962). 
 33.  See HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 898 (arguing inefficiency is created by the differing 
values individuals ascribe to entertainment).  For a parallel argument regarding suboptimal 
regional allocation of resources, due to a similar effect caused by exempting amenities from 
taxation, see Michael S. Knoll & Thomas Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes for 
Regional Living Costs and Amenities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 987, 1016-17 (2003) (arguing 
failure to consider regional living costs in income tax calculation discourages investment in 
high-cost regions).  Knoll and Griffith themselves draw the analogy between taxation of 
mixed expenses and taxation of living costs amenities.  Id. at 1016. 
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how the deductibility of mixed expenditures generates a distortive effect in 
the allocation of goods.  In a tax-free world, the funds would be invested in 
other goods than the desk that would generate higher levels of utility, but 
due to the tax an additional mahogany desk will be manufactured although 
it is inferior to other goods. 
Furthermore, the mixed expenditures deduction might be inefficient 
even in situations where providing the deduction would generate higher 
profits for the firm.  For example, assume that the desk generates a $50 
increase in the firm’s profits. If the expense were not deductible, the desk 
would not have been purchased.  Thus the taxpayer incurs a cost of $100, 
and his private benefits are only $85 (the $60 value he attributes to the desk 
plus the $25 after tax profits the desk generates).  Yet the social value of 
the desk—$110 ($60 stemming from the private benefit + $50 from the 
increase in profits)—is greater than its cost ($100).  The deduction thus 
drives the individual to make a socially optimal investment that would not 
have occurred without it.  But, even if 75% of the cases in which the 
deduction motivates purchasing a Mahogany desk correspond to the 
efficient case, and 25% correspond to the inefficient case, in the aggregate 
the deduction will still be inefficient.  For every three cases in which it 
generates a social surplus of $10, there will be one case that it generates a 
social cost of $40.  Therefore, knowing that some efficient investments will 
not take place without the deduction for mixed expenses is not sufficient 
for concluding that the deduction is efficient.  The costs of the deduction’s 
distortionary effect may offset the costs of the investment decisions lost by 
eliminating the deduction, depending on the variables mentioned above.  
The claim here is not that eliminating the deduction is necessarily more 
efficient, but only that no categorical determination could be made 
regarding the efficiency of the mixed expenditure deduction, as implied by 
Dillon, without detailed information regarding the variables above. 
Besides the distortionary effect, providing a deduction for mixed 
expenses might have an additional cost that stems from its distributive 
effect.  As noted, enabling one to deduct mixed expenses permits individual 
opportunities for tax-free consumption.  Needless to say, this effect raises 
considerable fairness problems, particularly a violation of the horizontal 
equity principle.  According to the horizontal equity principle, individuals 
with a similar welfare or income level should pay a similar amount in 
taxes.34  By permitting an individual to convert some of his consumption 
 
 34.  The term horizontal equity was coined by Richard Musgrave, see RICHARD 
MUSGRAVE, A THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160 (1959), for a description of the principles of 
horizontal equity.  The term that couples horizontal equity in fairness analysis is that of 
vertical equity: treating individuals with different welfare levels or income levels differently 
from a tax perspective.  Some scholars have questioned whether the two terms are 
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into tax-free consumption, we allow him to pay less in taxes than other 
individuals with an equivalent level of real income or consumption level. 
The distributive effect of enabling mixed expenses is not only 
problematic on the fairness level, but also on the efficiency level.  A 
progressive tax under which an individual’s tax liability increases as her 
income increases is justified on efficiency grounds.  Given the decreasing 
marginal utility of money, the decrease in one’s welfare from paying a 
dollar of tax grows as the individual has less money.  Accordingly, an 
optimal tax scheme would prescribe minimizing the overall social decrease 
in welfare resulting from tax payment by equating the marginal sacrifice 
taxpayers incur from the payment of the marginal dollar.35  Enabling some 
individuals with a certain income or consumption level to pay less and thus 
reduce their marginal sacrifice per dollar of taxes ensures that other 
individuals will have to pay more with a higher marginal sacrifice per 
dollar of taxes.  Permitting individuals to deduct mixed business and 
consumption expenses and provide them with tax-free consumption will 
cause an increase in the overall sacrifice of welfare required for raising a 
certain amount of taxes.  As a consequence, aggregated social welfare will 
decrease. 
This economic analysis strengthens the case for taxing mixed 
expenditures, but as noted above, it is not necessarily a decisive argument.  
It yet may be that the efficiencies of providing a deduction for mixed 
expenditures outweigh the efficiencies of eliminating a deduction for mixed 
expenditures.  The overall effect depends on the contingencies in each 
mixed expenses setting.  The next section presents a normative-
philosophical argument for eliminating a deduction for mixed expenditures.  
Even though this argument stands on its own, it is important to show that 
even from the economic perspective neither of the two options is 
categorically more efficient than the other.  In this setting the normative-
philosophical argument is much more significant in affecting the legal 
outcome. 
 
superfluous: are analytically equivalent and are two sides of the same coin.  See generally 
Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992); Louis Kaplow, 
Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NATL. TAX J. 139 (1989).  For 
counter arguments regarding the analytic need of both terms, see generally Alan J. Auerbach 
& Kevin A. Hasset, Tax Policy and Horizontal Equity, in INEQUALITY AND TAX POLICY 44 
(R.G. Hubbard & Kevin A. Hasset eds., 2001); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A 
Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once 
More, 43 NATL. TAX  J. 113 (1990). 
 35.  MUSGRAVE, A THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE at 91. 
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III. THE NORMATIVE-PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT FOR TAXING STATUS 
This section provides a justification for eliminating the mixed 
expenditures deduction based on an argument for taxing status.  Taxing 
status means taxing a transaction that contributes to an individual’s social 
status, even if it did not confer a personal benefit on that individual.  In 
other words, even if an individual does not feel she benefits personally 
from higher social status, or is not interested in so benefiting, she should 
still be taxed for gaining status. 
The argument in this part of the article will be comprised of two steps.  
First it will substantiate the claim that the tax base should not necessarily 
be comprised of income and could consist of other features such as social 
status.  This claim will mostly rely on a strand in the philosophical 
scholarship that has been labeled “relational egalitarianism.”36  The second 
step in this part of the article will substantiate the claims that the existence 
of mixed expenses intensifies one’s social status.  Being in a position where 
one’s vocation compels one to use resources that seem to benefit him on a 
personal level is itself a proxy for strong social status.  In this part I will 
mostly rely on the Weberian analysis of social status and its various 
sources. 
A. Incorporating Social Status into the Tax Base 
The crux of the argument of this article is that social status should be 
incorporated into the tax base, independent of its effects on one’s welfare.  
Such argument deviates substantially from the conventional approach in tax 
policy, in which the tax base consists of consumption, income or one’s 
welfare in the wider sense.  After all, why should one be taxed for social 
status, if one derives no benefit from it and it does not promote one’s 
welfare in any sense? 
In order to answer this question, we need to examine the definitions of 
the proper tax base and the discussions in the scholarship regarding these 
definitions.  Such an examination will expose that the argument presented 
in this article is less revolutionary than it seems at first glance.  Although 
the question of ‘what is income?’ is perceived as one of the most 
fundamental questions in tax policy, some scholars have questioned its 
centrality to tax policy. 
Many tax articles, examining whether a certain transaction should be 
taxed, start with the Haig-Simons definition of income.  Scholars analyze 
the different components that comprise income according to the Haig-
 
 36.  Infra note 49. 
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Simons definition—savings and consumption—and their scope.37  They 
then pass on to an analysis of whether the transaction in question fits that 
definition.  If the transaction fits into the definition of income provided, it 
is argued that it should be taxed,38 and if it is not it is mostly argued that it 
should not be taxed.39 
Professor Stanley Kopelman defines income as “[the] power to 
consume that is reduced to economic rights and is capable of valuation.”40  
Kopelman’s underlying justification for his definition is rooted in an 
attempt to capture what constitutes one’s personal welfare.  Professor 
Johnny Rex Buckles adds an additional element to this definition: control.  
Power to consume without the ability to exert control over that power 
should not be defined as income.41  Professor Mark Kelman adds yet 
additional element: in order to credit an individual with having income, it is 
not sufficient that the individual has the power to control the usage of the 
resource, but that he derives satisfaction from the usage of resource.42  The 
differences between definitions of income mainly stem from the 
consumption element in the underlying Haig-Simons definition.  In order 
for an activity to be defined as consumption, does it require the agent’s 
intentions?  Does it require that the agent benefit from the resources? 
My argument is based on the notion that the question of whether a 
certain transaction should be defined as income is not the key question for 
determining whether the transaction should be taxed, in contrast to the 
scholarship surveyed above.  In this respect, I follow Professor David 
Weisbach’s argument that inquiries into the definition of income are futile 
for providing an answer for whether a given transaction should be taxed.  
According to Weisbach: 
The issue for mixed personal and business expenses is whether 
they should be treated as personal or business expenses.  But the 
Haig-Simons definition of income is simply that–a definition.  
The definition itself cannot make that determination. Thus the 
 
 37.  See supra Introduction (describing Haig-Simons analysis). 
 38.  See, e.g., Joseph Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 152-62 (1992) 
(discussing taxation of personal injury recovery). 
 39.  See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 17-20 (1973) (addressing income definition); R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of 
an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1967) (arguing for a basic income concept). 
 40.   Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX 
L. REV. 679, 694 (1988). 
 41.  Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory, 80 IND. L. J. 947, 962 
(2005). 
 42.  Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an 
“Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 
831, 831-58 (1979). 
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Haig-Simons definition is unhelpful for line drawing consistent 
with its strictures.43 
Weisbach claims that in determining whether a certain transaction should 
be taxed, it is of no use analyzing whether the transaction fits into a certain 
definition or doctrinal rule.  Instead we should examine the values that the 
tax system seeks to promote.44  It is possible that these values will justify 
taxing a transaction that is not necessarily defined as income-generating or 
as consumption.  The conventional approach is that the tax system has three 
overarching goals: redistribution, efficiency and fairness.45  Assessing 
fairness, furthermore, is mainly broken into two tests: vertical and 
horizontal equity, which essentially both require that similarly situated 
taxpayers be treated equally.46  But as Weisbach points out, just referring to 
vertical and horizontal equity in and of itself does not provide an answer 
for how a transaction should be treated.  In order for the principles of 
vertical or horizontal equity to generate any concrete implications, one has 
to determine the meaning of “similarly situated taxpayers.”47  What criteria 
should we use to determine if individuals are “similarly situated”?  
 
 43.  David Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1626, 1646 (1999). 
 44.  This argument is grounded in the legal realist view, which rejects the essentialist 
approach toward doctrinal rules.  The most prominent supporter of this view was Judge 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, see The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897), for a 
discussion of legal realism. 
 45.  Some scholars argue that the fairness goal coincides with the redistributive goal.  
See Murphy & Nagel, supra note 4, at 38 (addressing equal sacrifice). 
 46.  Among scholars there is a dispute as to whether there is an analytical need for both 
vertical and horizontal equity, or whether one is a logical implication of the other; namely, 
that these two concepts are two sides of the same coin, as this article implies.  Richard A. 
Mussgrave, Kevin Hasset, and Alan Auerbach, the major proponents for both terms, do not 
consider them to be analytically equivalent.  See generally Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. 
Hasset, Tax Policy and Horizontal Equity, in INEQUALITY AND TAX POL. 44 (R.G. Hubbard 
& Kevin A. Hasset eds., 2001); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 
FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NATL. 
TAX J. 113 (1990).  In contrast, Louis Kaplow, Liam Murphy, and Thomas Nagel do view 
the two terms as analytically equivalent and thus as superfluous. As Liam Murphy and 
Thomas Nagel state in their book: 
Horizontal equity is just a logical implication of any traditional answer to the 
question of vertical equity. If tax justice is fully captured by a criterion that 
directs government to tax each level of income at a certain rate, it simply 
follows that people with the same pretax incomes, should be taxed at the same 
rate.MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 4, at 37.   
See also Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992) 
(criticizing the concept of horizontal equity); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in 
Search of a Principle, 42 NATL. TAX J. 139 (1989) (suggesting rationales offered for 
horizontal equity align with conventional understandings of risk and vertical equity). 
 47.  Weisbach, supra note 43, at 1647. 
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According to Weisbach, in order to provide an answer for whether a certain 
transaction should be taxed, one has to address the fundamental social 
values that the tax system should promote and it is not sufficient to merely 
refer to these definitions or principles. 
Following Weisbach, this article analyzes the fundamental social 
values that the tax system should promote.48  Simply put, the tax system 
should aim at reducing the social status gap between individuals.  This idea 
stems from an alternate understanding of redistribution known as relational 
egalitarianism,49 which stands in contrast to the conventional redistributive 
view known as luck egalitarianism.  While luck egalitarianism focuses on 
the equal distribution of resources or welfare in society by compensating 
misfortune,50 relational egalitarianism seeks something more subtle—
equality as manifested in social relations, and not necessarily in the 
redistribution of welfare or resources.51 
 
 48.  Tsilly Dagan has made a similar argument to Weisbach’s in the context of the 
classification of business and personal expenses.  Dagan pointed out the futility of working 
with the distinction between business and personal expenses.  Dagan claimed that expenses 
are not inherently ‘business expenses’ or ‘personal expenses’—the classification of the 
expense is value-driven, and thus in order to determine whether an expense is deductible 
one should examine directly the expense through the lens of the values we think the tax 
system should promote.  See Tsilly Dagan, Ordinary People Necessary Choices: A 
Comparative Study of Childcare Expenses, 11 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 589, 616 (2010) 
(analyzing business and personal deduction distinctions for child care).  For a similar 
argument in the context of commuting expenses, see Tsilly Dagan, Commuting, 26 VA. TAX 
REV. 185 (2006-2007), which uses commuting expenses to illustrate the difficulty of 
distinguishing business and personal expenses). 
 49.  The term was coined by Stuart White.  Stuart White, Welfare Philosophy and the 
Third the Way, in WELFARE STATE CHANGE: TOWARDS A THIRD WAY 25, 37 (Jane Lewis & 
Rebecca Surender eds., 2004). 
 50.  As Anderson defines luck egalitarianism, “[l]uck egalitarianism relies on two moral 
premises: that people should be compensated for undeserved misfortunes and that the 
compensation should come only from that part of others’ good fortune that is undeserved.”  
Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS 287, 290 (1999). 
 51.  Although the discussion of Anderson, Wolff, and the luck egalitarians whom they 
criticize is centered on the concept of equality, it has a significant application to welfare 
policy at large.  As scholars have noted, most of the arguments among luck egalitarians 
concern the proper ‘space’ or ‘currency’ for the application of egalitarianism.  See Ronald 
Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 J.  PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 
333 (1981) (supporting the view, held also by scholars such as John Romer and Eric 
Rakowsky, that egaliterian justice should focus on the distribution of resources; See also 
G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989) (supporting the 
view that egalitarian justice should focus on the distribution of welfare).  Thus, these 
arguments are relevant to almost any welfare policy, even one which isn’t strictly 
egalitarian, yet must still define the ‘space’ or ‘currency’ for its application.  As a 
consequence, the discussion of relational egalitarians such as Wolff, Anderson, and Schefler 
and the luck egalitarians is a discussion regarding the normative underpinnings of almost 
any welfare policy: the social phenomena on which it should primarily focus. 
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The central critique of luck egalitarianism and the redistributive views 
that emanate from it is that it reinforces the hierarchical structure of 
society.  As Anderson has pointed out: 
[E]quality of fortune makes the basis for citizens’ claims on one 
another the fact that some are inferior to others in the worth of 
their lives, talents, and personal qualities.  Thus, its principles 
express contemptuous pity for those the state stamps as sadly 
inferior and uphold envy as a basis for distributing goods from 
the lucky to the unfortunate.  Such principles stigmatize the 
unfortunate and disrespect the fortunate by failing to show how 
envy can obligate them.52 
Accepting that the primary social goal of egalitarianism should be breaking 
the hierarchical structure of society, Anderson calls for, “focusing on 
equality as a social relationship, rather than simply as a pattern of 
distribution, at least enables us to see that we have a choice between 
redistributing material resources and changing other aspects of society to 
meet the demands of equality.”53 
While Anderson suggests “changing other aspects of society” in order 
to promote relational egalitarianism, she does not define these other 
“aspects of society” and the policies that should be enacted in order to 
affect such changes.  This article aims to enter into this void.  Sublimating 
society’s hierarchical structure could be achieved by eradicating symbols of 
social status.  Total eradication by regulation that does not permit the 
existence of certain social statuses obviously raises considerable liberty and 
autonomy problems.54  Taxing such symbols of social status, however, 
strikes a good balance between the goal of redistributing social status and 
liberty and autonomy considerations.  By placing a higher price on symbols 
of social status such taxation restricts and limits their existence in society, 
while still enabling individuals to make use of such symbols if they 
attribute great importance and value to them despite their increased price. 
 
 52.  Anderson, supra note 50, at 289. 
 53.  Id. at 336. For a discussion of Anderson’s conception of relational equality and its 
policy implications, see Adi Libson, Transforming Social Welfare Policy: The Sages’ 
Reconstruction of the Institution of the Second Tithe as a Model for Social Welfare Policy, 
29 J. L. & RELIG. 259, 274-75  (2014).  
 54.  This is rooted in the general tension between liberty and equality.  See Isiah Berlin, 
Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 125-26 (1969), for an 
examination of conceptions of freedom. 
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B. Instances of Mixed Expenditures as Paradigmatic Cases of Social 
Status 
After presenting the argument why social status should be 
incorporated into the tax base, I turn to the second step required for the 
claim of this article—that instances of mixed expenditures constitute a 
significant source of social status.  The Weberian analysis of social status 
and its sources substantiates this claim.  Max Weber defines social status as 
“an effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative 
privileges.”55  Weber enumerates three central sources for such status, one 
of which is “occupational prestige.”56  He goes on to note four means by 
which status is expressed, one of which is “appropriation of privileged 
modes of acquisition.”57 
Mixed business and personal expenses fully correspond to the 
Weberian locus of status and its expression.  These expenditures arise in 
the relevant context: they can, and often are, interpreted as a claim for 
social esteem stemming from occupational prestige.  These expenditures 
also constitute one of the venues for the expression of status that Weber 
mentioned: a privileged mode of acquisition.  In the context of mixed 
expenses, one is able to acquire personal goods while depicting them as 
business expenses that are not incurred for one’s own sake, but for the sake 
of the business.  Only a limited number of individuals, usually the 
economic elite, are in positions in which the interest of the business could 
be aligned with their own personal interests.58 
Weber emphasizes that although social status often overlaps with 
economic status—what he names in his analysis the commercial class or 
social class—it is a distinctive social phenomenon.  The significance of the 
Weberian analysis stems from this distinction: conceptualizing and 
pointing out to social power that does not solely stem from economic 
factors: 
Status may rest on class position of a distinct or an ambiguous 
kind.  However, it is not solely determined by it: Money and 
entrepreneurial position are not in themselves status 
qualifications, although they may lead to them; and the lack of 
property is not in itself a status disqualification, although this 
 
 55.   MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 305 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
1978) 
 56.  Id. at 306. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  This argument regarding taxing privileged modes of acquisition applies to the 
related case of fringe benefits provided for employees, that will be discussed infra Part IV, 
Section A. 
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may be reason for it.  Conversely, status may influence, if not 
completely determine, a class position without being identical 
with it.  The class position of an officer, a civil servant or a 
student may vary greatly according to their wealth and yet not 
lead to a different status since upbringing and education create a 
common style of life.59 
The Weberian framework therefore illuminates the justification for taxing 
mixed expenditures, even if the individual does not derive any utility from 
them.  Even though these expenses cannot be defined as income in the 
narrow sense, they still enhance that individual’s status relative to others.  
Although the indicators of status are not purely economic phenomena and 
thus cannot necessarily be classified as consumption, they are still a 
significant phenomenon from which the individual gains status and social 
power.  This social dimension is relevant to tax policy if we follow a 
relational egalitarian approach. 
It has already been noted that the social status argument is 
independent not only of first order benefit—whether the individual benefits 
directly from the business expense—but also from the second order benefit: 
whether the individual benefits indirectly from the social status the 
business expense generates.  Taxing the international travel expenses in a 
case where the individual does not benefit from them due to his preference 
to stay with his family is not based on the assumption that the individual 
benefits indirectly from the social status the expense generates.  Even if the 
individual does not benefit from the social status generated, the argument 
still applies and we should still tax these business expenses.  An individual 
might not be interested in prestige, and it may even cause him disutility.  
Yet if social status is admitted into the tax base, it can justify taxing 
prestige even if the individual does not benefit in the economic sense from 
the prestige that accompanies mixed expenditures.  There are two 
arguments why it is justified to tax social status independent of the question 
of whether the individual actually benefits from her social status.  The first 
is the positional nature of social status and the second is that that objective 
power, and not subjective benefit, might be the primary focus of the tax 
base. 
Firstly, the nature of social status, that is in essence a relative or 
positional good, justifies taxing social status even when it does not enhance 
the individual’s utility level.  The enhancement of one’s social status will 
always be at the expense of the social status of others, independent of 
whether one actually desired to enhance one’s social status.  As Professor 
Balkin writes: 
 
 59.  Id. 
ARTICLE 2 (LIBSON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/15  11:21 AM 
1160 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
Status Competition is intense because status is a relative good.  
One has more of it because others have correspondingly less.  
Status Competition tends to be zero-sum, at least in the short run.  
More generally, it is non-paretian: one cannot increase the status 
of one group without decreasing the status of another.  High 
prestige is prestige over others and in distinction to others.  
Increased respect for lower status groups because their identity 
has been constructed around their greater prestige and the greater 
propriety of their ways of living.60 
The fact that status is a limited good reinforces the rationale of taxing those 
who obtain it, independent of whether they actually derive utility from 
possessing it.  It is possible to frame the concern for social status in 
economic terms.  The social status of one individual causes envy among 
her peers and reduces their welfare.  In other words, social status is a 
negative externality, and thus should be internalized by the individual 
generating it.61  Just like the internalization of any other negative 
externality, its internalization does not depend on whether the individual 
generating the negative externality has benefited from it.62 
The second justification is that gaps in social status are a social bad 
per-se, independent of their welfare effects on individuals.  While the first 
justification could be presented in a standard economic-welfarist form, the 
second is a non-welfarist justification.  It is not based on the assumption 
that an individual’s high social status necessarily diminishes the welfare 
level of other individuals in society.  One may argue that it could still be 
presented in an economic form—that in some sense social hierarchy is a 
bad that should be internalized by the agent—but that applies to almost any 
moral theory that could be described in an economic form.63  Almost any 
 
 60.  J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2328 (1996-1997). 
 61.  Robert Frank is the leading economist on the incorporation of social status into 
economic models that are relevant to various legal contexts.  See generally ROBERT H. 
FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); 
Robert H. Frank, Should Public Policy Respond to Positional Externalities, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 
1777 (2008); Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable 
Welfare Losses, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 137 (2005); Robert H. Frank, Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001). 
 62.  See A.C PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, 188 (2d ed. 1924) (discussing 
mechanisms for internalization of externalities). 
 63.  Regarding the possibility that a certain social outcome is bad independent of the 
welfare level of individuals in society, see Dereck Parfit, Equality or Priority, 10 RATIO 
202, 205 (1997), noting equality could be valued based on deontological grounds, and not 
only based on consequential grounds.  See also Larry Temkin, Weighing Goods: Some 
Questions and Comments, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 350 (1994) (demonstrating how an 
outcome in which everyone’s welfare is relatively low might have lower social value than 
the outcome in which everyone’s welfare level is relatively high, when taking into account 
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moral theory could be described as aiming to minimize a moral bad or 
trade-off welfare for minimizing the moral bad up to a certain point.64  The 
emphasis is that the argument for taxing social status is not necessarily a 
welfarist argument.  Even if the second justification could be framed as an 
economic argument, it certainly cannot be framed as a welfarist argument.  
In other words, while it could be described as maximizing the social good 
in broad terms, it is not concerned necessarily with the welfare of 
individuals in society. 
The best account for explaining why prestige should be measured 
objectively and not subjectively goes back to the relational egalitarian 
view.65  The relational egalitarian view stands in contrast to standard 
theories of distributive justice that are primarily concerned with the 
distribution of welfare or resources.  Welfare is mostly perceived as a 
subjective element.66  Thus distributive theories that center on distribution 
of welfare are oriented toward subjective valuation of goods.  This article is 
based on a version of the relational egalitarian distributive theory that is not 
primarily concerned with distribution of welfare, but in the distribution of 
status.67  Such theory is interested in the phenomena of status per-se, and 
thus the question of the subject’s valuation of her status is irrelevant.  This 
view provides the grounds for which we should be concerned with prestige 
on the objective level and not on the subjective level of the individual’s 
valuation of prestige.68 
 
considerations such as desert). 
 64.  See Chris W. Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A 
More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 805-06 (2000) (emphasizing that economic 
models, such as models of maximization of social goods, could incorporate non-welfarist 
goods such as equity). 
 65.  See supra Introduction (summarizing relational egalitarian view). 
 66.  JOHN BROOM, ETHICS OUT OF ECONOMICS 4 (1999).  But cf. DERECK PAFRIT, 
REASONS AND PERSONS 499 (1984) (describing a theory of objective welfare). 
 67.  See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing relational egalitarianism 
and luck egalitarianism). 
 68.  There may be other justifications besides the relational egalitarian one that provide 
a non-welfarist justification for ignoring the subjective valuation of status and prestige.  It is 
possible to explain such view through the prism of tax fairness without alluding directly to 
any redistributive theory.  Two of the central principles defining tax fairness could justify 
relying on objective standards: the benefit principle and the equal sacrifice principle.  
According to the benefit principle of tax fairness an individual’s tax liability should be 
proportional to one’s benefit from public goods.  See supra text accompanying note 4 
(describing the benefit principle).  Applying the benefit principle to the case of social status 
and prestige requires adopting a fairly wide understanding of public goods; the benefit 
principle applies only to benefit derived from public goods.  A wide definition of public 
goods will include any good derived from the public or any good for which there isn’t a 
feasible method for charging consumers.  See Stephen Enke, More on the Misuse of 
Mathematics in Economics: A Rejoinder, 37 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS, 131 (1955) (warning 
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This section of the article has presented the central argument for the 
non-deductibility of mixed expenditures.  The argument was comprised of 
two parts: the first substantiated the idea that social status should be 
incorporated into the tax base and taxed, grounded on the relational 
egalitarian view; the second exposed how instances of mixed expenditures 
fit neatly into the Weberian definition of social status, and thus constitute a 
classic case for applying the taxation of social status.  While the latter part 
of the argument was especially tailored to the case of mixed expenditures, 
the former part of the argument is much wider in its scope, and may apply 
to a large array of cases.  The next section will examine the applicability of 
the social status tax to other instances in which the existence of social 
status may be relevant to tax treatment. 
 
against overly formal economic definitions); Julius Margolis, A Comment on the Pure 
Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 247 (1955) (arguing for a broad 
definition of public goods).  But see Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public 
Expenditures, 36 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 387-89 (1954) (presenting a narrower and 
conventional definition that limits public goods only to non-rivalry and non-excludable 
goods).  The motivation behind the benefit principle is to mimic the purchase of private 
goods in the market with taxes functioning as a kind of shadow price for goods and services 
provided.  Fried, supra note 4, at 162, 165.  Just like in the private sector the price 
determination of a good thus does not depend on the subjective valuation of the individual 
purchasing the good, instead, the price in conventional models is universal.  Id.  Fried 
argues against this view, claiming that there is no reason to mimic the feature of the market 
which determines one price for all individuals, independent of their subjective valuation of 
the good.  This feature of the competitive market has no inherent justification, besides its 
technical ability to ‘clear the market’—make sure that there is no additional unit that its 
marginal cost is lower that the value an individual attributes it.  If the system would try to 
price discriminate between individuals with different valuations of the good, it might cause 
an inefficient allocation by charging an individual a price higher than his actual valuation of 
the good, and thus causing that that individual to not possess the good, although his 
valuation of the good is higher than the goods marginal cost.  The pricing of a public good 
will not affect the quantity of the good produced, and thus this technical advantage is not 
relevant to the pricing of public goods.  Id. at 166.  The general maxim of the equal sacrifice 
principle is simple: a fair tax burden is one in which all individuals sacrifice equally, see 
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 4 (summarizing the equal sacrifice principle).  One of the 
central differences between the different versions is whether the sacrifice should be 
measured in subjective units such as welfare, or in objective unit of resources such as 
money.  Regarding the former metric, see Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: 
Equality of Welfare, 10 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 185, 245 (1981).  Regarding the latter view, 
that Dworkin himself accepts, see Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of 
Resources, 10 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 283, 333 (1981).  According to the objective units 
theory, it makes more sense to measure prestige in objective units, and not in subjective 
units of the benefit the individuals drives from prestige.  Just like the measurement of 
sacrifice in terms of money could be done without differentiating between the different 
value individuals attribute to money, so can the prestige element be measured without 
differentiating between the different value individuals attribute to prestige. 
ARTICLE 2 (LIBSON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/15  11:21 AM 
2015] TAXING STATUS 1163 
 
IV. ADDITIONAL APPLICATIONS FOR TAXING STATUS 
So far, this article has focused on the application of taxing social 
status as embodied in mixed expenditures, but the argument for taxing 
social status may have other implications on the tax system.  This section 
focuses on four additional applications: the treatment of fringe benefits, 
consumption taxes, the deductibility of extremely high salary expenses, and 
the tax treatment of charitable contributions. 
A. The Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits 
The term “fringe benefits” refers to in-kind benefits transferred to an 
employee by the employer.  In some cases these benefits may be similar to 
the benefit derived from mixed expenditures, such as trips to Europe and 
pick-ups by limousines, and in others, they may be a distinctive set of 
benefits that are relevant mostly to employees, such as uniforms and 
qualified discounts for employees.  The main difference between benefits 
derived from mixed expenditures and fringe benefits is that while the 
former are at the discretion of the taxpayer, the latter are mostly imposed 
on him by his employer.  Fringe benefits may serve as an additional form 
of compensation and as such should be taxed, or may also be essential to 
the performance of the employee’s job, creating a strong argument for 
exempting them from taxable income.69  The most direct implication of the 
argument above for the tax treatment of fringe benefits concerns what is 
labeled in the I.R.C. as “working condition benefits”: 
For the purpose of this section, the term “working condition 
fringe” means any property or service provided to an employee 
of the employer to the extent that if the employee paid for such 
property or services, such payment would be allowable as a 
deduction under section 162 or 167.70 
This section of the I.R.C. refers directly to section 162, the section that 
discusses the treatment of mixed personal and business expenses.  Thus any 
argument that would apply to section 162—including this article’s 
argument that mixed expenditures should be taxes as personal 
expenditures—should also apply to expenditures made by an employer on 
behalf on an employee.  If an entrepreneur should receive no deduction for 
a business flight, then neither should an employee be able to exclude it 
from his income when his employer pays for the flight. 
 
 69.  Graetz & Schenk, supra note 19, at 96. 
 70.  26 U.S.C. § 132(d) (2012).  Working condition benefit is excluded from income 
under § 132(a)(3). 
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But this article’s argument for eliminating mixed expenditures 
deductions rests on the social status conferred, and so should not 
necessarily apply to the same benefit incurred by an employee.  An 
identical benefit does not necessarily generate the same social status in the 
context of an employee as for an entrepreneur or self-employed individual.  
The social status emerges from the individual’s control over the decision to 
incur the expense, an element that is generally absent for an employee in 
the case of fringe benefits.  That said, in many cases there is no difference 
between the social status the benefit generates for a self-employed 
individual and an employee.  There seems to be no difference between the 
social status generated by a business trip of top executives and that of a 
self-employed individual.  This argument may justify differentiating the tax 
treatment of fringe benefits according to the employee’s hierarchical level.  
Lower status employees, for example the state troopers who received free 
lunches in the case of Commissioner v. Kowalski,71 should receive a tax 
deduction.  Higher status employees, such as the manager of an exclusive 
Hawaiian resort who received free meals and lodging perks in the case of 
Benaglia v. Commissioner,72 should not receive a deduction.  Deciding 
when fringe benefits should be fully deductible may turn out to be a factual 
determination best left to a case-by-case determination, which will impose 
considerable complexity on the implementation of this general argument. 
In order to demonstrate how some fringe benefits are inherently 
distinct from mixed expenditures, the discussion below will focus on two 
types of fringe benefits: qualified employee discounts and no-additional-
cost services.  Qualified employee discounts are an example of a type of 
fringe benefit that almost categorically should not be affected by the 
argument for taxing status.73  Under the qualified employee discount 
exclusion, an employee can exclude from income a discount of up to 20% 
from the price at which the employer offers the service to customers,74 or in 
case of merchandise, up to the employer’s gross profit percentage.75  These 
fringe benefits typically apply to salespeople and do not confer high social 
status on the individual benefiting from them; therefore these benefits 
should not be taxed. 
A borderline exclusion for fringe benefits from the perspective of 
taxation of status is the no-additional-cost service exclusion.76  According 
to this exclusion, as long as the service that the employer, or a business 
 
 71.  Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977). 
 72.  Benaglia v. C.I.R., 36 B.T.A 838 (1937). 
 73.  26 U.S.C. § 132(a)(2)(2012). 
 74.  26 U.S.C. § 132(c)(1)(b) (2012). 
 75.  26 U.S.C. § 132(c)(2) (2012). 
 76.  26 U.S.C. § 132(a)(1) (2012). 
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with a reciprocal agreement with the employer, does not require them to 
incur any extra costs, the service could be excluded from income.77  For 
example, an employer might enable the employee to make use of the 
employer’s office’s parking space even for non-work related purposes.  On 
the one hand, in contrast to the qualified employee discount exclusion, it 
does not seem to be necessarily correlated with low or medium level of 
social status.  On the other hand, it is hard to determine clearly that it is 
unrelated to high social status.  While there is an incentive to provide such 
benefits to all employees—an opportunity for the employer to provide 
compensation which is both cost-free from his side and tax-free from the 
side of the employer78—such additional cost services may be especially 
tailored for higher-end employees and thus signal high social status.79  
Because there is no clear answer in this case without additional empirical 
data, it does not seem that taking into account the taxation of status should 
affect the tax treatment of such cases. 
The justification for taxing status in all types of fringe benefits is not 
decisive, even in the types of fringe benefits to which it seems that taxing 
status argument should apply.  There may be other considerations—
economic and otherwise—that might lead to a different conclusion.  The 
primary purpose of this article is to expose an additional reason for levying 
a tax that has not been addressed.  In order to reach a conclusion regarding 
the desired policy, one would have to balance the reason for taxing based 
on the social status argument with all other considerations that may apply 
within a specific context. 
B. The Taxation of Top Executive Compensation 
Since the beginning of the millennium, legal scholarship has grappled 
extensively with the apparently excessive compensation received by top 
U.S. corporate executives, compensation that seems to result from non-
arms-length dealing and that all too often seems to bear no relation to 
performance.80  This trend intensified after the 2008 market crash.81  
 
 77.  26 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2012). 
 78.  See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 19, at 103 (discussing the general economic 
incentives to provide fringe benefits). 
 79.  It should be noted that there is a nondiscrimination requirement in order for such 
benefits to be excluded.  See 26 U.S.C. § 132(e)(2) (2012) (requiring the benefit “not 
discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees”).  Yet even if the benefit has to be 
provided without discriminating between the employees in the same firm, it may yet signify 
social status of workers in certain industries, e.g., if the parking benefit is mostly provided 
to all employees in law firms but not to any blue-collar employees in factories. 
 80. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSIE FRIED, PAYMENT WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (suggesting managers use 
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Looking to ameliorate this problem, the tax code eliminates the 
deductibility of compensation of over one million dollars that is not 
incentive-based.82  In addition, golden parachute payments receive only 
limited deductibility,83 and an additional 20% tax is imposed on certain 
compensation packages.84  Due to the limited applicability of the current 
tax scheme, many scholars have argued for a greater role for the tax code in 
curbing excessive compensation for top executives.85 
The argument presented in this article reinforces the case for imposing 
a special tax on top executives, but on different grounds than the aim to 
curb non-arms-length dealing and non-performance based compensation.  
As Professor Robert Frank has noted, motivation for receiving very high 
compensation packages is not necessarily rooted in an executive’s desire 
for consumption power, but instead in many cases by the desire for higher 
status.  Over a certain level, compensation does not affect one’s 
consumption patterns, and the main motivation to attain it is the desire for 
higher social status.86  The fact that many executives’ compensation 
packages are common knowledge exacerbates this dynamic.  Frank notes 
that social status is a positional good and thus unlike other goods for which 
there is not necessarily any firm cap on their production, the attainment of 
social status is a limited good and is always at the expense of others; as 
such, it constitutes a negative externality.  The fact that a high degree of 
social status generates a negative externality, unlike other forms of 
consumption, justifies imposing a higher tax rate, similar to other 
Pigouvian Taxes.87 
This additional justification for increasing the tax burden on highly 
compensated executives, whether by increasing their tax rate or by 
eliminating the corporation’s ability to deduct expenses tied to the 
compensation given to them that are economically equivalent, has two 
 
flaws in corporate governance to distort their own pay). 
 81.  See Katalin T. Haynes, Joana Tochman Campbell & Michael A. Hitt, When More 
is Not Enough: Executive Greed and its Influence on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. MGMT. 1 
(2014) (finding a negative relationship between CEO greed and shareholder return); Adair 
Morse, Vikram Nanda & Amit Seru, Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?, 
66 J. FIN. 1779 (2011) (suggesting CEOs rig the incentive portion of their pay). 
 82.  26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2012). 
 83.  26 U.S.C. § 280G (2012). 
 84.  26 U.S.C. § 4999 (2012). 
 85.  See David I. Walker, A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 325, 326-29 (2013) (suggesting imposing an additional 10% surtax on executives and 
coupling it with a tax relief for investors); Tristen Cohen, Curbing Executive Compensation: 
A New Tax Scheme, 5 LEGISLATION AND POLICY BRIEF 199, 200-01 (2013) (suggesting a 
90% tax rate for earnings that exceed 100 times the earnings of the average employee). 
 86.  FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND, supra note 61, at 45-55. 
 87.  Id. at 122-23. 
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important implications.  While the main concern of the current tax scheme 
is the burden imposed on shareholders by the excessive pay given to top 
executives, under the rationale suggested in this article the main concern is 
the excessive compensation given to these top executives per se.  Under the 
former rationale, the question of whether such tax scheme is desirable 
depends on the incidence of the tax.  Some scholars argue that the tax 
incidence of the current scheme lands on share-holders in any event: boards 
“gross-up” these additional taxes so that executives will end up with the 
same amount of post-tax compensation despite higher taxes, and thus 
shareholders end up baring the additional tax burden.88  If this is the case, 
the stated rationale cannot support the tax scheme: a tax designed to protect 
shareholders ends up harming them.  Furthermore, this rationale should 
apply only to public companies for which there is a need to defend 
shareholders from this non-arms-length dealing.89  Bebchuk and Fried note 
that the excessive compensation stems from the managerial power due to 
dispersed ownership.90  Dispersed ownership is typically a feature of 
publicly traded companies and not private companies.91 
In contrast, according to this article’s proposition, the elimination of 
the deduction or the higher tax rate on excessive compensation should be 
implemented in the two cases above.  In this analysis, even if the tax 
burden rests on shareholders, it should not make a difference.  The practice 
of providing compensation that is mainly directed at enhancing one’s social 
status generates a negative externality on society, which should be 
internalized.92  Who should internalize the externality—shareholders or 
 
 88.  Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive 
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485 (2009); Ryan Miske, 
Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive 
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1679 (2003-2004); Bruce A. 
Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV. 125, 128-29 
(2001).  Besides the issue of tax incidence, some scholars claim that this tax scheme does 
not make any difference on compensation package decisions for top executives.  See Nancy 
Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence 
Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 20 J. LABOR ECON. 138, 142-43, 166-67 (2002) 
(finding little correlation between performance sensitivity of CEO pay and tax policy).  This 
is a concern if the purpose of the tax is to reduce corporate spending on compensation 
packages for top executives, but not if the concern is really the proper tax attached to status. 
 89.  Miske, supra note 88, at 1674. 
 90.  Although there might be an additional need to protect the minority shareholders in 
a privately held company, Bebchuk and Fried argue that the main source for excessive 
compensation is managerial power in companies in which ownership is dispersed, see 
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 80, at 17, 42. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  While it could be argued that any compensation package enhances the employee’s 
social status, a distinction should be made between compensation that is directed toward 
increasing the individual’s ability to consume conventional goods and the enhancement of 
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executives—is of lesser concern; the main point is that it should be 
internalized.  In addition, because this justification for internalization is not 
based on the goal of protecting shareholders in contexts in which 
ownership is dispersed, but on imposing a price on high compensation that 
is mainly targeted toward generating high social status per se, the tax 
should be implemented also in the context of private companies and not 
only in the context of public companies. 
C. Consumption Taxes 
Many countries that have some form of consumption tax impose a 
higher tax rate on luxury goods such as yachts, diamonds, private jets, and 
others goods whose consumption does not proceed linearly with income.  
From the beginning of the millennium, there has been a renaissance of the 
luxury tax around the world.  In 2000, Australia imposed a special tax on 
luxurious automobiles93 as did Russia at the same time.94  China currently 
has a tax on a wide range of luxury goods ranging from a rate of 4.4% to 
60%.95  In the U.S., President George H.W. Bush passed through Congress 
a special tax on luxurious commodities such as yachts and private planes in 
1990.  Purchases of certain listed commodities above a certain price 
threshold were taxed an additional 10%.96  This tax was repealed by 
Congress, however, by 2002.97 
Generally, the primary motivation behind luxury consumption taxes is 
redistribution: they attempt to offset the regressive effect of consumption 
taxes that apply equally to individuals of different income levels.  
Increasing the tax rate on goods whose consumption correlates strongly 
 
the individual’s social status is only a side effect and compensation, mostly to the top 
earners, which is directly directed toward enhancing the individual’s social status.  While in 
the former case, the individual gains an additional benefit besides the benefit he derives 
from the negative externality of appropriating social status, in the latter case there is no such 
benefit and it is merely a zero sum game. 
 93.  See Prafual Pearce, The Luxury Car Tax: Past its Use-by Date, 47 TAX’N IN AUSTL. 
703 (2013) (criticizing Australia’s luxury car tax). 
 94.  See Dale Chua, Tax Reform in Russia, in RUSSIA REBOUNDS (2003) 77, 82 (noting 
Russia’s luxury car tax). 
 95.  Barton Beebe, Shanzhai, Sumptuary Law and Intellectual Property Law in 
Contemporary China, 47 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 856 (2014). 
 96.  26 U.S.C. § 4002 (1993).  Regarding the American luxury tax and its 
consequences, see Lillian R. BeVier, Judicial Restraint: An Argument from Institutional 
Design, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 11 (1994) (suggesting the luxury tax raised little 
revenue). 
 97.  Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B. C. L. REV. 1363, 
1396 (2003-2004) 
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with high levels of income creates a more progressive consumption tax.98 
The argument for taxing social status reinforces the redistributive 
argument for taxing exclusive goods.  Many of these goods signify the 
higher social status of their owner, which justifies an additional tax beyond 
a conventional consumption tax.  The application of the taxation of social 
status justification to these cases may be significant, because it does not 
necessarily overlap with the redistributive argument.  In cases where the 
redistributive and social status arguments do not overlap, a higher tax rate 
on such products would eliminate or decrease significantly the 
consumption of the goods.  In such cases, the redistributive argument 
would not apply.  Applying the additional tax would be self-defeating: not 
only would it not increase the ability to redistribute, it would even decrease 
it.  The state would lose the tax it collected from the consumption of these 
exclusive products up to the point where additional taxation would destroy 
the demand for these products, significantly decreasing revenue that could 
be redistributed. 
In contrast, the argument for taxing status still applies even if it 
reduces the ability to promote redistribution of resources and indeed still 
justifies a higher tax rate.  The elimination of consumption of a good that 
intensifies social status gaps and competition in society may make society 
better off in real terms.  This aspect in which society is better-off may off-
set the costs of decreasing the aggregated wealth, and as a consequence, the 
government’s ability to redistribute income. 
D. Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions 
An additional application of the argument for taxing status is the tax 
treatment of charitable contributions.  There has been a longstanding 
dispute regarding the tax benefits provided in many countries to those who 
donate charitable contributions, whether in the form of a deduction, as in 
the U.S.,99 or in the form of a credit or partial credit in other countries such 
as Canada, France and New Zealand.100  Most of these arguments have 
centered on whether such contributions should be defined as part of donors’ 
income: on the one hand a donor does not consume the resources donated 
in the everyday sense of the word, but on the other hand this donor had 
control over the resources and he exercised his control in spending them.101 
 
 98.  Id. at 1395. 
 99.  26 U.S.C § 170(b) (2012). 
 100.  See generally INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, Global Tax 
Surveys, https://www.ibfd.org/IBFD-Products/Global-Tax-Surveys. 
 101.  See BUCKLES, supra note 41 (arguing control should be an aspect of income 
definition); KOPPELMAN, supra note 40 (offering a definition of income); KELMAN, supra 
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As noted earlier,102 the question of whether a transaction should count 
as income should not be a constitutive element for answering whether a 
certain transaction should be taxed.  In order to decide on whether the 
transaction should be taxed, one has to analyze the transaction in light of 
the overarching goals of the tax system.  The taxation of status argument 
justifies eliminating any tax benefit from charitable contributions, even if it 
does not constitute a form of consumption or income.  Charitable 
contributions also signify the high social status of the donor, justifying the 
taxation of the contribution independent of whether the donor consumed or 
personally benefited from the donation.  The donation places the donor in 
the position of a public benefactor, a position that radiates high social 
status. 
Even if one is not willing to adopt the broad implications of taxing 
status and eliminating the charitable deduction altogether, there may be a 
more limited application.  Namely, it may reinforce the case for eliminating 
the deduction from borderline cases, such as quasi quid pro quo 
transactions.  Quasi quid pro quo transactions are charitable contributions 
in which there is a “price menu” or “fee schedule” depending on the level 
of recognition in which the donor is interested.103  Current practice of the 
I.R.S. does not differentiate between a regular charitable contribution and a 
quasi quid pro quo charitable contribution and grants a deduction to such 
contributions.104  An example of a quasi quid pro quo charitable 
contribution is a contribution to a university that ‘prices’ various forms of 
commemorations: a contribution over X amount of dollars earns the donor 
a plaque with him name on a room, over Y amount of dollars earns 
professorship chair endowed with his name, and over Z amount of dollars 
earns a building with his name; the donor actually contributes over and 
above one of these sums in order to purchase one of these forms of 
commemoration or acknowledgment. 
The treatment of such contributions is surprising in light of the 
I.R.S.’s interpretation of charitable contributions as a transfer that is made 
by the donor to the donee “without adequate consideration” in return.105  It 
seems quite plausible that such definition would exclude the quasi quid pro 
quo transaction in which the “fee schedule” and “price menu” reflect that 
 
note 42 (suggesting satisfaction derived from a resource is part of income definition). 
 102.  See discussion supra Part I (summarizing current approaches to taxation). 
 103. J.D. Colombo, Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions 
Deduction; Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 657, 664 (2001). 
 104.  Id. at 666. 
 105.  Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. 
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the donor it receiving “adequate consideration” in return for his donation.106  
The donation is essentially a transaction in which the donor is purchasing a 
good: recognition, commemoration, or fame.107  While some views 
regarding the rationale for the charitable deduction justify the I.R.S.’s 
decision to permit applying the charitable deduction to such transactions,108 
the taxation of status rationale will reinforce the case for taxing the donor 
in a quasi quid pro quo transaction.  After all, the quasi quid pro quo 
transaction signifies clearly that an increase of one’s social status is 
involved and, as such, should be taxed whether in the form of a direct tax 
or an excluded deduction.  The taxation of status provides an additional 
reason to exclude the charitable deduction from quasi quid pro quo 
donations. 
V. CRITIQUES 
Even assuming one has accepted the arguments presented in this 
 
 106. COLOMBO, supra note 103, at 665-67.  This is especially true in light of the 
Hernandez decision.  Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).  In Hernandez the 
Supreme Court accepted the I.R.S.’s position that a contribution to the Church of 
Scientology could not qualify for the charitable deduction.  The Church of Scientology’s fee 
schedule provided the grounds for the decision: it required payment per spiritual auditing 
and resembled a quid pro quo transaction.  In its ruling, the court has expanded the 
“adequate consideration” exclusion for the charitable deduction.  Such an expanded 
interpretation is more likely to include conventional quasi quid pro quo transactions in 
which there is a fee schedule or price menu. 
 107. COLOMBO, id. 
 108. Colombo argues that scholars that adopt the community benefit rationale for the 
charitable deduction should justify applying the deduction to quasi quid pro quo transactions 
as well.  According to the community benefit rationale the grounds for the deduction is 
supplying more resources to NGOs; the setting in which the resources are supplied does not 
matter.  The only reason for the restriction on quid pro quo transactions is so NGOs will not 
use the subsidy to compete unfairly with for-profit firms that produce the same good and do 
not receive a subsidy.  As long as the good in question is not supplied by for-profit firms, 
such as in the case of the standard quasi quid pro quo transaction, there is no reason to 
restrict the charitable deduction from applying to such transactions.  COLOMBO, id. at 692-
96.  See also John Colombo & Mark A. Hall, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION (1995), 63-
65 (stating that the community benefit theory suggests a subsidy that matches the size of an 
organization also matches the merit of the organization); Rob Atkinson, Theories of the 
Special Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations, in FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 15-1, ¶ 15.02[2] (Francis Hill & Barbara Kirsten eds., 
1994)(claiming that while the Bittker and Rahdert income definition theory assumes 
charitable donation exemptions are due to the technical difficulty of including charities in 
the income tax, not an effort to subsidize these charitable activities, this is faulty 
assumption, and therefore there must be a substantive reason for the exemption).  The 
position narrowing the “adequate consideration” limitation for benefiting from the charitable 
deduction was adopted by Justice O’Connor in her dissenting opinion in Henandez.  
Hernandez, supra note 106, at 704-13. 
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Article for taxing status per se, there are two possible objections to the 
form of its central application in the context of mixed business and 
personal expenditures.  The first concerns the rate for taxing status, the 
second concerns the tax base on which status is taxed.  In addition, there is 
a more general critical objection against taxing nonmarket, non-monetized 
goods such as status on grounds of commodification.109 
A. The Rate for Taxing Status 
Even if one accepts the argument for taxing status, it does not answer 
the question of why the proper tax rate for taxing status equals exactly the 
value of the deduction of the expense in the case of mixed expenditures.  
Without taxing status, one would have received a deduction for the 
business expense that includes a personal element, especially in cases in 
which the individual was not motivated by the personal element.  
According to the argument above, because being in the position where 
one’s business expenses are aligned with personal elements is a feature of 
high social status, one should be taxed simply for being in that position.  As 
a consequence, one is taxed by eliminating the deduction one would have 
been entitled to if no consideration of social status was involved.  But why 
should the tax on status exactly equal the value of the deduction?  After all, 
the tax on status could be lower than the value of the deduction, and thus 
would only reduce the deduction and not eliminate it completely.  
Alternatively, it would be possible to set the tax higher and require an 
additional payment from people in the position to record mixed 
expenditures and not limit the tax the deductibility of the expense.  
Furthermore, taking status and considerations of vertical equity110 seriously 
might entail not only taxing jobs from which one derives high social status, 
but also crediting individuals who have jobs that confer upon them a low 
social status.111 
 
 109. The most basic critique of a novel suggestion, such as the one presented in this 
paper, is its practicability and applicability.  In this article this problem is especially pressing 
due to the novelty and abstractness of the suggestion that raises many technical problems. 
For this reason this question was mostly addressed in the section examining the economic 
justification for the argument, which also addresses its economic feasibility, at Part II of this 
article.  In addition, questions of practicability and feasibility have been streamlined in other 
sections of this article, especially the previous section discussing the additional possible 
applications of the argument and also in some of the critiques below.  Consequently, this 
section of critiques does not include a separate subdivision discussing practical problems in 
the implementation of the taxation of status. 
 110.  See Musgrave; Auerbach & Hasset, supra note 46 (discussing horizontal and 
vertical equity). 
 111.  The idea of crediting individuals whose jobs confer upon them low social status is 
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Analytically, this point seems correct.  There is no inherent reason 
why the tax on status in cases of mixed expenditures equals the value of the 
deduction of the expense.  The argument in this Article could justify a tax 
on status that is lower or higher than the deduction of the expenses.  There 
is nothing in the argument that implicates a tax on status should exactly 
equal the deduction.  There are two reasons for the form of the suggested 
application.  The first and more obvious one is technical: this is the most 
convenient form for applying the argument.  Any other partial deduction or 
increase of the tax rate would complicate its application and require higher 
costs for its implementation.  This is especially true in case of imposing a 
higher tax rate on instances of mixed expenditures: it will create a serious 
compliance problem—the taxpayer will have no reason to inform the tax 
authorities of such expenditures, which will only increase his tax liability.  
Consequently, it would be extremely costly for the tax authorities to obtain 
information regarding the occurrence of such expenditures.  The second 
reason is the supplementary role of the argument for taxing status.  It was 
noted earlier that it is very complicated to determine whether the individual 
actually derived utility from the expense and, if so, whether it was the 
underlying motivation for spending the resources.112  The status argument 
‘piggy-backs’ on the additional reasons for eliminating the deduction, and 
it can tilt the scales towards the elimination of the deduction but is not 
necessarily strong enough to prescribe the legal outcome independently. 
This critique is also relevant to the other applications suggested for 
taxing status such as the executive compensation and charitable deduction 
examples.  The argument for taxing status does not justify the total 
exclusion of the deduction in cases of excessive executive compensation or 
charitable contributions.  Also, in the additional application suggested for 
the taxation of status, similar reasons shaping the two examples noted 
above shaped the application suggested. 
 
more problematic, and not only due to technical limitations.  One might claim that the low 
social value is already incorporated in the wages they receive.  To this there are two main 
responses.  The first is that people in low socioeconomic levels might not have the 
bargaining power to compensate themselves through their wage for the low socioeconomic 
status that accompanies the job.  The second is that, similarly to the case of high social 
status, the objective social disvalue of low social status might exceed the subjective 
disvalue.  The bigger problem of crediting low social value is that it may have the adverse 
effect of increasing the social gaps in social status.  A credit for jobs with low social status 
might increase the supply of such jobs and people will have a greater incentive to take such 
jobs. 
 112.  See supra Introduction (examining definition of income). 
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B. Universality of the Tax Base: Taxing Status Only in a Specific 
Context. 
Even if one assumes that the argument for taxing status per se is a 
valid argument, one may argue that it might still be better to avoid applying 
it if it is not applied systematically.  This article addresses a limited 
problem—tax treatment of mixed expenditures—and suggests a solution 
based on a fundamentally new approach toward the principle that underlies 
the tax system.  Although four additional applications for a ‘status tax’ 
have been suggested, one may argue that it is better not to apply it at all 
than to apply it in a limited form in a few narrow cases.  A limited 
application raises the problem of horizontal equity—not treating equally 
situated individuals alike.  Taxing the status that an individual derives from 
mixed expenditures without taxing the status that undoubtedly arises in 
many other contexts violates horizontal equity.113  If status should be part of 
the tax base, then it should be taxed consistently or not taxed at all. 
There are two replies to this point.  The first is that it is not necessarily 
correct to see all social status as one conglomerate.  It may be possible to 
distinguish between different kinds of social status that emerge in different 
contexts.  Taxing one form of social status, such as the social status and 
prestige that emerges from working in a job with mixed expenditures, does 
not necessarily entail taxing other forms of social status.  Hence taxing 
social status in the context of mixed expenditures does not necessarily 
violate horizontal equity. 
This reply is problematic.  Even if we are willing to accept the fact 
that there may be many forms of social status, and that treating these forms 
of status differently does not necessarily violate horizontal equity, it may 
still be problematic to tax social status only in the context of mixed 
expenditures or even the additional applications suggested.  The social 
status that the position of mixed expenditures generates is the phenomenon 
we saw earlier that Weber paid special attention to—prestige from one’s 
vocation.114  There may be many other instances of the Weberian form of 
social status that is not accompanied by mixed expenditures.  One may 
claim that certain jobs, such as a sports star or movie actor, are 
accompanied by a similar social status that originates from the prestige of 
their vocation, even if they are not necessarily in the position in which 
there are many mixed expenditures.  Thus taxing social status in case of 
mixed expenditures without a systematic approach toward similar forms of 
 
 113.  See MUSGRAVE, A THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 34, at 26 (outlining 
horizontal equity). 
 114.  See supra Part III, Section B (discussing Weber’s definition of social status). 
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social status is highly problematic, even it is hard to imagine how to apply 
this theory to other situations. 
This brings us to the second reply.  The problem is a genuine concern 
that cannot be refuted.  It is true that the application of the ‘status tax’ is 
fairly limited, which raises concerns of horizontal equity and thus that it 
might be better not to apply it at all than to apply it partially.  Furthermore, 
it is questionable whether it is actually possible to apply a status tax more 
broadly than in the few cases mentioned in the conclusion of this article.  
This is a question for which this article does not provide a full answer.  Yet 
also in this context it is worth pointing out that in the case of mixed 
expenditures there are other grounds for taxing mixed expenditures.  The 
individual may have derived utility from the personal consumption 
element.  The status can be seen as a consideration that joins other 
considerations in tilting the scales—even if the individual did not 
necessarily derive any utility or was not necessarily motivated by the 
personal consumption element, the social status he derives tilts the scale to 
the side of eliminating his ability to deduct his expenses.  As mentioned 
above, this critique and reply apply in general to the other applications 
suggested. 
Also, in the other applications, in most cases, there are independent 
reasons, even if not as strong, for reaching the same bottom line as under 
the taxation of statues argument.  In the case of fringe benefits, there are 
reasons to suppose that they should not be excluded from income and 
should be fully taxed: providing in-kind benefits should not be treated 
differently from monetized compensation.  In the case of charitable 
contributions, there are reasons to suppose that the quasi quid pro quo 
charitable contribution should be fully taxed: they are a form of 
consumption that should not be treated differently from other forms of 
consumption of intangible goods such as going to the movies.  The taxation 
of status rationale still makes a difference because the prior reasons weren’t 
sufficient to be decisive.  The status tax is an additional reason that can be 
used in order to tilt the scales toward the conclusion of fully taxing the 
transaction in the cases above. 
C. The Commodification Critique 
Some scholars have criticized extending the application of taxation to 
certain social contexts that are normally perceived as outside the realm of 
the market and taxation.115  The central reason for such objection is the 
 
 115.  See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn, Exclusion from Income of Compensation for Services 
and Pooling of Labor Occurring in a Noncommercial Setting, 11 FLA. TAX. REV. 683, 686-
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negative commodification effect of taxation: taxation requires placing a 
price tag on the item taxed.116  This monetization of the good devalues it 
because it flattens out its unique value by assuming the good could be fully 
replaced by money.117  This critique applies especially to the case of taxing 
status: social status is normally perceived as a realm in which taxation does 
not apply, at least not directly.  Placing a price tag on social status turns 
social status into a commodity that one could buy and sell, and empties it of 
social meaning.118 
Even scholars who are disturbed by effects of commodification, 
however, should not be disturbed in this case.  First, as Professor Tsilly 
Dagan has noted, commodification might also have a positive effect in 
certain contexts.119  This might be true in the case of status.  If we accept a 
normative position that views social status as negative phenomenon, its 
devaluation through commodification might actually be a desirable effect. 
It is possible to argue that even if one views status as a negative 
phenomenon, commodification may yet have a negative effect.  Scholars 
have pointed to an additional effect of commodification besides 
devaluation: intensification of saliency through commodification.120  
 
91 (2011) (concluding that income tax only applies to commercial activities); Debra Lefler, 
“Keeping Books on Romance”: The Gift Exclusion in Nonmarital Relationships, 105 NW. 
U. L REV. 1739, 1762-66 (2011) (contending that market behavior is not an fitting 
approximation of intent); Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REV. 93, 95-101 
(2009) (using the commodification critique to argue against applying market tools to all 
areas of life); Ray Madoff, Taxing Personhood: Estate Taxes and the Compelled 
Commodification of Identity 17 VA. TAX REV. 759, 763-64 (1998) (claiming that “the estate 
tax can force the commodification of an individual’s identity”); Nancy Staudt, Taxing 
Housework, 84 GEO. L. J. 1571, 1573-75 (1996) (suggesting women’s nonmarket labor 
inside the home should be valued in addition to market labor performed outside the home); 
Mark Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income 
Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 841-44 
(1979) (arguing taxpayers should be taxed on their actual earnings, not their capacity to 
earn).  For scholarship on the commodification phenomenon in general, see MARGARET 
JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY 
PARTS AND OTHER THINGS 1-15, 155-64 (1996), for a description of commodification as a 
world view and in the context of objectification and subordination; Margaret Jane Radin, 
Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1905-06 (1987), for a general definition of 
commodification within the context of personal identity. 
 116.  Dagan points out four dimensions in which taxation might have a commodifying 
effect.  Of the four she points out, the one that is relevant to the case of taxing status is the 
third one–commodification through the attachment of a price tag.  See Dagan, Itemizing 
Personhood, supra note 115, at 96 (suggesting four ways in which tax law and 
commodification interact). 
 117.  RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 115115, at 56. 
 118.  Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, supra note 115, at 110. 
 119.  Id. at 112. 
 120.  Id. at 135. 
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Placing a price tag on the status element isolates it and signifies its self-
standing significance.  This increases the saliency of the status element that 
accompanies mixed expenditures and may result in enhancing individuals’ 
pursuit of status and only intensifying gaps in social status. 
There are two replies to this point.  One is that even if this effect is 
true, it works simultaneously with the devaluation effect of status 
mentioned previously, and thus to some extent they cancel out each other.  
The second is that it is questionable how strong the commodification effect 
is in the case of eliminating a deduction for mixed expenses and 
consequentially, to what extent saliency might increase.  This article seeks 
to introduce the idea that social status should not be disregarded, but also 
not to place specific price tag on status signifiers.  In the implementations 
discussed in this article there is no active evaluation of status, only a 
passive elimination of a deduction on grounds of status.  This was part of 
the critique mentioned in the previous point—that there is no proper 
assessment of social status, that its value may be higher or lower than the 
value of the deduction.  While this is a problematic feature of the 
suggestion proposed in this article addressed in the beginning of this 
section,121 it ameliorates the commodification problem.  This critique 
applies in principle also to the other application of the status tax mentioned 
in this article, and so does the response.  As noted above, commodification 
is context sensitive and thus might apply to a different extent in each of the 
applications.  This article does not go into the ranking of the level of the 
commodification problem in each of the applications mentioned, but only 
raises the general concern of commodification. 
CONCLUSION 
This article suggests redefining the tax base to include social status, a 
suggestion that provides a new rationale for fully taxing mixed business 
and personal expenses.  I have demonstrated how the economic cost of 
such a tax is probably overrated.  Even though it is possible that such tax 
may prevent some efficient business investments from taking place, there 
are economic benefits that may offset this cost.  Taxing such mixed 
expenditures will prevent the distortion of providing compensation through 
goods that could be classified as mixed expenses at the cost of other goods 
that the individual would have actually preferred.  In addition, the employer 
has the best information regarding the real value her employee attributes to 
the mixed expenses.  She could just gross-up the employee’s compensation 
so it will not be affected by the tax imposed on the expenses.  This could be 
 
 121.  See supra Part V, Section A (discussing status tax rate). 
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done by compensating the employee for the tax payment that exceeds the 
value he attributes to the personal expense element. 
The purpose of the economic argument is to clear the stage for the 
normative–philosophic argument that stands at the center of this article.  It 
substantiates the claim that the economic costs of fully taxing mixed 
spending are not necessarily that high.  The normative-philosophical 
argument justifies fully taxing mixed expenditures based on the idea that 
the existence of such mixed expenditures signifies high social status.  
Under the economic justification, taxing the individual for a mixed expense 
that he did not really benefit from is a false positive: a negative side effect 
of the attempt to capture individuals who do benefit personally from the 
mixed expense.  Under the philosophical justification, however, taxing 
such individuals is justified in and of itself: according to the Weberian 
analysis of social status, the fact that they are in a position in which mixed 
expenses occur is itself an attribute of high social status that should be 
taxed regardless of whether they actually benefit personally from the 
expense.  This argument for taxing high social status is grounded in a wider 
philosophical view labeled as “relational egalitarianism.”  According to the 
relational egalitarian view, social policy should not focus solely on the 
distributive pattern of resources or welfare.  Instead it should be concerned 
with the structure of relationships among individuals.  This concern may 
overlap with the distribution of resources and welfare to a great extent, but 
it may still differ from it significantly.  The argument for taxing social 
status and mixed expenditures attempts to fill the void in the actual positive 
implications of the relational egalitarian view. 
The primary purpose of the argument for taxing status in this article is 
to provide a new perspective on the tax treatment of mixed expenditures.  
Furthermore, as an argument for redefining the proper tax base, it may have 
much wider implications.  In this article I have discussed four possible 
applications of the argument for taxing status: tax treatment of fringe 
benefits, tax treatment of high compensation levels for top executives in 
corporations, consumption taxes, and tax treatment of charitable 
contributions.  The implication on the tax treatment of fringe benefits is 
quite similar in theory to the implication on mixed expenditures but in 
practice might be narrower due the lower social status gained by simple 
employees.  Regarding top executive compensation, the taxing status 
rationale provides an additional justification for eliminating deductions on 
excessive compensation packages.  It justifies employing such schemes 
even in contexts in which the traditional justification for such schemes—
protecting shareholders—does not apply, namely, when the tax incidence 
rests on the shareholders, or compensation for executives in private 
corporations.  The third implication is a higher tax rate for commodities 
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that signal high level of social status.  A ‘status tax’ would justify implying 
a consumption tax, even in cases in which it would undermine the central 
justification for such tax: redistribution of resources.  The fourth is 
regarding the tax treatment of charitable contributions.  The taxation of 
status consideration turns on the question of whether charitable 
contribution is a form of consumption to be irrelevant to the question 
regarding the proper tax treatment of such contributions.  The fact that the 
contribution intensifies the social status of the individual is sufficient for 
taxing him and eliminating the deduction for his contributions. 
The new argument presented in this Article raises quite a few 
problems.  The first is the arbitrariness of the tax rate in all of the 
implementation mentioned, besides fringe benefits and taxation of 
consumption.  Taking into account social status as part of the tax base does 
not explain why the proper way to take it into account is by denying a 
deduction for mixed expenditures, executive compensation and charitable 
contributions.  The second is that even though this article has listed 
numerous possible implementations for the taxation of status approach, 
these are still small islands in the wide sea of economic activity to which 
taxation applies.  Surely, social status aspects are involved in many other 
transactions to which taxation applies.  While the reluctance to imply status 
taxation widely is easily understood due to numerous practical problems 
such as quantification, it raises the concern of whether there is any value in 
a partial implementation, even if it includes a few different cases for 
implementation. 
The answers to these two concerns are similar: biting the bullet—
acknowledging the weaknesses in the applications of the argument but 
insisting that the advantages of these applications offset the weaknesses.  
While granting that the concerns raise true problems with the form 
suggested for applying status taxation, I still think that there is no better 
form for applying taxation of status; a partial implementation is better than 
disregarding social status all together. 
The third critique I dealt with was a more radical critique of taxing 
status that did not confine itself only to its form of implementation: the 
commodification critique.  I have argued that, even to scholars that are 
disturbed by issues of commodification, the case of taxing status might be 
one of the cases in which the effects of commodification are positive. 
While the argument for taxing status may seem farfetched, I do think 
it could especially play an important role in tilting the scales in cases in 
which there are conflicting reasons for the proper tax treatment of a 
transaction such as in the case of mixed expenditures and the other cases 
discussed in this article.  Beyond the application of status taxation to the 
issue of mixed expenditure, I hope this article succeeds in shedding a new 
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light on the fundamental question that underpins taxation: the theoretical 
question of what should comprise the tax base. 
 
